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Office: LOS ANGELES, CA

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APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(h) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:



INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director Administrative Appeals Office

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DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant is the spouse of a naturalized United States citizen and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), so that he may reside in the United States with his spouse and children.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated October 9, 2003.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant's qualifying relatives will suffer extreme hardship if the applicant is forced to depart the United States. *Form I-290B*, dated October 24, 2003. The AAO notes that counsel requested 30 days after filing the appeal to submit a brief and/or evidence to the AAO. Over one year has elapsed since the filing of the appeal and no additional documentation has been received into the record. The appeal will therefore be decided based on the record as it currently stands.

The record contains a letter from the applicant's spouse, dated September 19, 2003; a copy of the naturalization certificate of the applicant's spouse; a copy of the marriage certificate of the applicant and his spouse; copies of the United States birth certificates of the applicant's child and stepchild; a copy of the naturalization certificate of the applicant's brother and a copy of the deed of trust for property owned by the applicant and his spouse.

The record reflects that on or about August 5, 1994, the applicant was convicted of Indecent Exposure in Public in the Municipal Court of Pomona Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California. The applicant was sentenced to serve five days in jail and placed on probation for three years. The record further reflects that on or about September 30, 1998, the applicant was convicted of Indecent Exposure in Public in the Superior Court of California, County of San Bernardino. The applicant was sentenced to serve 90 days in jail and placed on probation for three years. The applicant was also required to register as a sexual offender.

Section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act states in pertinent part:

- (i) [A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-
 - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude . . . or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime . . . is inadmissible.

Section 212(h) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

(h) The Attorney General [Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraph $(A)(i)(I) \dots$ of subsection $(a)(2) \dots$ if -

• • •

(1)(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien . . .

A section 212(h) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(2)(A) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse, child or parent of the applicant. Any hardship suffered by the applicant himself is irrelevant to waiver proceedings under section 212(h) of the Act. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-566 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the Board of Immigration Appeals deems relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

Counsel asserts that the inadmissibility of the applicant will cause extreme financial hardship to the applicant's spouse and children if they remain in the United States in the absence of the applicant. Letter from Isabel C. Mata, dated September 19, 2003. As noted by the district director, the record fails to establish that the income earned by the applicant exceeds the income earned by the applicant's spouse. See Individual Income Tax Return for 2000. Further, the record fails to demonstrate that the applicant will be unable to provide financially for his family from a location outside of the United States. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship. The applicant's spouse states that she will be unable to afford the mortgage payments on the family's home in the absence of the applicant. Letter from Isabel C. Mata. While this situation is unfortunate, a change in living situation, standing alone, cannot form the basis of a finding of extreme hardship.

Counsel makes no assertions regarding whether hardship would be imposed on the applicant's spouse and children by relocation to Mexico in order to remain with the applicant.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. See Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. Hassan v. INS, supra, held further that the uprooting of family and separation

from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse and children will likely endure hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. However, their situation, based on the record, is typical to individuals separated as a result of deportation or exclusion and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse and children caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. See Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.